Tuareg separatists and al-Qaeda-linked fighters combine to cause havoc in Mali
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Samira Elsaidi
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Tue, 05/05/2026 - 14:06
An unofficial partnership has put Goita's government on the back foot. Can it last, or will ideological differences tear it apart?
Malian President Assimi Goita attends the state funeral of Defence Minister Sadio Camara, who was killed in a suicide attack, in Bamako, Mali, 30 April 2026 (handout)
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A new, undeclared partnership between Tuareg separatists and an al-Qaeda-affiliated armed coalition is rocking Mali’s ruling junta and causing havoc across the country’s north.
Yet it remains unclear whether this collaboration has scope to become deeper and more official, or how long it will last.
On 25 April, Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) Tuareg separatists and Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam Wal-Muslimin (JNIM) fighters staged coordinated attacks on several Malian cities.
Sadio Camara, the defence minister, was killed in a suicide attack on his residence. And fighting has since been ongoing, with the rebels claiming control of the city of Kidal and strategic Tessalit military base in the northeast in recent days.
JNIM, a collection of armed groups from various Malian communities that formed an al-Qaeda-affiliated coalition in 2017, is blockading the capital Bamako and has called for a broad "common front" to "bring down the junta" and proceed with "a peaceful and inclusive transition".
The attacks, a Malian official told Middle East Eye, “were sudden and highly coordinated, targeting sensitive sites such as military bases and the airport, which disrupted the command structure”.
The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said “the speed and simultaneity of the attacks exposed gaps” in the Malian’s government’s defensive coordination.
Mali’s military government, which took control after coups in 2020 and 2021, insists the situation is largely stable.
The official claimed the army, which is supported by Russia’s Africa Corps paramilitary force, “regained control within hours”.
Yet sources in northern Mali paint a different picture.
Ahmed, a Timbuktu resident, said that clashes are still ongoing and members of the Africa Corps had been taken prisoner by the FLA.
“Kidal, Gao and surrounding areas are witnessing intermittent fighting, with some locations effectively under siege,” he said.
Tactical coordination
Tuareg separatist sentiments have endured in northern Mali for a century, with rebellions against the central state breaking out repeatedly since the colonial French exited in 1960.
The most significant was in 2012, when the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a secular separatist organisation, allied with religious conservative Tuareg group Ansar Dine to launch attacks on the Malian government, seizing the north and precipitating a coup in Bamako.
Despite declaring northern Mali an independent state named Azawad, the groups were defeated following infighting and United Nations and French military interventions.
Yet the fighters remained on the fringes of Mali’s society and territory.
Ansar Dine became the leading member of JNIM. Meanwhile, the FLA was founded in 2024, merging the MNLA’s remnants with other Tuareg groups.
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Wary of the MNLA’s previous experiences with Ansar Dine, where stark differences emerged over the latter group’s hardline interpretation of Islam, the FLA largely kept JNIM at arm’s length.
Yet now, despite those ideological differences, there is clear evidence of coordination between the two groups.
Jibrin Issa, a writer and political analyst specialising in Sahel affairs, told MEE that the latest developments represent “a marriage of necessity from Azawad’s perspective, and an operational arrangement from al-Qaeda’s perspective”.
“The aim is to distract the Malian army in the north while jihadist groups push southwards to encircle the capital and open multiple pressure fronts simultaneously,” he said.
Hamdi Jowara, a Malian journalist based in Paris, described the relationship as “a temporary alignment driven by the presence of a strong common enemy that neither side can defeat alone”.
He added that coordination “is reflected more in a division of roles across fronts than in any formal organisational integration”.
On the ground, Ahmed from Timbuktu described the relationship more bluntly.
He is Tuareg, critical of the Malian government and broadly sympathetic to the Azawad movement, which reflects his background and community ties.
“We are not fighting each other… our enemy is the same,” Ahmed said of FLA and JNIM.
Ahmed, who has relatives and contacts who are fighting with the FLA, told MEE that there is “an understanding not to engage, alongside coordination in the timing of attacks and movement in certain areas”.
He suggested that may include an implicit understanding over spheres of influence.
Kidal: the first to fall
The Tuareg-majority city of Kidal has emerged as the centre of operations so far.
Notably, while the FLA says it holds Kidal, which is 1,500km to the northeast of Bamako, JNIM claims it controls the city alongside the Tuareg separatists.
Sharif Ag Akli, a Kidal fighter with the Azawad Liberation Front, told MEE that “the city has been under our control since the start of the fighting”.
“We returned to our city and want to live freely. We are not terrorists, we are demanding our legitimate rights,” he said, sharing video footage that showed largely quiet and peaceful streets.
Tuareg rebels of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) coalition gather at the Kidal roundabout in Kidal, 26 April 2026 (AFP)
Local sources and regional analysts say the capture of Kidal came as a result of a large-scale, dual-front surprise offensive.
The Malian official said that “the number of attackers exceeded 2,000 fighters, forcing government forces and their allies to reposition to parts of the north”.
Elsewhere, there is heavy JNIM activity in central and western Mali. In Bamako and the south, Africa Corps-backed troops remain largely in control, despite occasional attacks.
Ahmed noted that the Russian paramilitaries had served as a bulwark for defending forces in the north.
“In previous confrontations, the Malian army would withdraw, but the situation has changed due to the support of the African Corps,” he said, adding that fighting has become “more intense and organised”.
International complications
When President Assimi Goita seized power in the 2021 coup, Mali distanced itself from France and grew closer to Russia.
At first, Russian Wagner Group fighters were deployed to Mali to support and protect Goita’s government and military.
After the 2023 Wagner mutiny against Vladimir Putin and the organisation’s practical demise, Moscow somewhat regularised the fighters’ deployment into a paramilitary force known as the Africa Corps.
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These units have been heavily involved in the recent fighting, such as at Bamako airport, where they have a headquarters. A Kremlin spokesperson has reaffirmed Moscow’s commitment to “combating terrorism and extremism in Mali”.
According to the Malian official, “the Russian role remains central at both the military and logistical levels”.
Yet, he noted, that “the real challenge lies in the expanding scope of operations” to go on the offensive.
Turkey, too, “supports the Malian army with drones and training programmes, improving its tactical capabilities”, the official said.
Though the FLA may find common cause with the JNIM in the short term, Issa warned that “any alignment with groups designated as terrorist will have negative international repercussions” for its independent Azawad project.
It “could close the door to mediation and complicate the regional landscape,” he said, with international institutions and western and regional governments unlikely to engage with something seen as associated with al-Qaeda.
What comes next?
Goita’s government has suggested that the attacks were supported and stoked by unfriendly countries such as France and Ukraine, offering no proof of the claims.
Yet one of most destabilising elements for Goita’s administration appears to have come from within.
Last week, the prosecutor at a military tribunal said preliminary findings point to “serious evidence” implicating members of the armed forces.
This, the statement said, includes active personnel, dismissed soldiers and others, who are under investigation suspected of planning, coordinating and carrying out the attacks, with possible involvement of political figures.
'Families flee deep into the desert, and the men return to fight'
- Ahmed, Timbuktu resident
Issa told MEE that “an operation of this scale suggests the likelihood of internal infiltration”.
According to Jowara, the journalist, “the situation is gradually stabilising, and there is a clear plan for response” from the government, predicting “military escalation”.
Issa, however, warned that “continued coordination between Azawad and JNIM could prolong the conflict and deepen its complexity”.
On the ground, reality remains stark.
“People have been living with war for years… families flee deep into the desert, and the men return to fight,” said Ahmed, a Timbuktu resident.
“Daily life is now tied to the rhythm of the fighting.”
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